Статья 14. 18. Вот ее частичный текст, о котором пойдет речь:

"Пользование правами и свободами, признанными в настоящей Конвенции, должно быть обеспечено без какой-либо дискриминации по признаку пола, расы..." и т.д.
Мне довольно трудно согласиться с этой частью Решения Суда или даже понять, как Суду удалось прийти к нему. По моему мнению, как только было установлено (это сделано в предыдущей части Решения Суда), что статья 11 не включает в себя права профсоюзов на консультации или какого-либо обязательства властей на консультации с ними, статья 14 не могла иметь никакого применения. В ней четко сказано, что лишь "пользование правами и свободами, признанными в настоящей Конвенции... [подчеркнуто мною], обеспечиваются без дискриминации..." (хочу оговорить, что здесь и далее я, как правило, не употребляю понятие "свободы"; для меня оно лишь иной способ обозначить право). Если, как признал Суд, свобода создания профсоюза и вступления в него не охватывает права профсоюзов на участие в консультациях с властями, это право не является одним из "прав и свобод, признанных в настоящей Конвенции", то и вопрос о дискриминации не встает. Он ни в какой ситуации не может возникнуть, если изначально нет права, в отношении которого только и возможна дискриминация. Там, где этого условия нет, а есть только некоторая добровольная практика (консультаций), такая практика может осуществляться дискриминационно, но это нельзя считать нарушением статьи 14, которая запрещает дискриминацию при пользовании "правами и свободами", и не относится к практике, осуществляемой на добровольной или дискреционной основе и не носящей обязательного характера.
19. Точка зрения (противоположная), выраженная в п. 44 Решения Суда, как мне представляется, не только не отвечает на эти вопросы, но если не игнорирует их полностью, то лишь "слегка касается", хотя, конечно, они были полностью доведены до сведения Суда. Я хотел бы привлечь внимание, в частности, к следующим аспектам:
i) В первом абзаце п. 44 Решения Суда сказано (второе предложение): "статья 14 не имеет самостоятельного значения, она дополняет другие нормативные статьи Конвенции" <*>. Слова, которые я выделил, хотя и не содержат никакой погрешности, эллиптичны и обходят существенное указание статьи 14 о том, что она распространяется только на "права и свободы, признанные в настоящей Конвенции". В числе их право на консультации не только отсутствует, но даже и не подразумевается, как определил Суд. Совершенно, конечно, справедливо утверждение, что статья 14 дополняет другие нормы, но "a" это осуществляется особым способом, о котором я скажу в п. 23 и 24 ниже, и "b" она может дополнить их в том случае, если они представляют собой самостоятельные права и свободы, что в данном случае не имеет места.
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<*> Утверждение по существу правильное, но формулировка оставляет желать лучшего. Как диспозиция статья 14 существует самостоятельно в целях, о которых будет сказано ниже в п. 23 и 24. Не существует как самостоятельная обязанность не дискриминировать, она зависит от других прав и свобод, признанных в других статьях Конвенции.
ii) Третье предложение первого абзаца п. 44 Судебного решения начинается следующим образом:
"Мера, которая сама по себе находится в соответствии с требованиями статьи, гарантирующей соответствующее право или свободу..." Но Суд только что установил в предыдущей части своего Решения, что право на участие в консультациях не закреплено статьей 11. Поэтому данный факт, игнорированный Судом, лишает смысла и продолжение <*>.
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<*> "может оказаться нарушением данной статьи, взятой в сочетании со статьей 14, по причине дискриминационного характера этой меры".
iii) Последняя фраза первого абзаца п. 44 Решения лишняя и ничего не значит. Независимо от того, имеет ли статья 14 самостоятельное значение или ее следует рассматривать как инкорпорированную в каждую из разных статей Конвенции, в обоих этих случаях она играет одну и ту же роль. Я вернусь к этому в п. 20 ниже.
iv) Аргумент, приведенный во втором абзаце п. 44 Решения, который я уже цитировал выше <*>, также является ложным и по тому же самому основанию. "Правом, включенным в Конвенцию", "правом такого рода", вытекающим из статьи 11, Суд считает право профсоюза "быть выслушанным". Но если даже согласиться с тем, что такое право действительно содержится в статье 11, оно не имеет отношения к данному спору; как я уже отметил в п. 10, право на консультацию, о котором идет спор в данном деле и в том плане, в котором вопрос поставлен профсоюзом бельгийской полиции, полностью отличен от права "быть выслушанным" (т.е. быть выслушанным, если профсоюз это попросит). Речь идет о праве на консультацию, осуществляемую по инициативе нанимателя или самого государства даже тогда, когда никто не обращался с просьбой быть выслушанным. Это разные вещи. Бельгийское Правительство не отказалось выслушать заявителя, оно отказалось консультироваться с ним, подобно тому, как оно консультируется с другими профсоюзами. Включено ли имплицитно или нет "право быть выслушанным" в статью 11, оно не то же самое, что право на консультацию, констатированное Судом.
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<*> "К такой логике прибегают тогда, когда право, предусмотренное в Конвенции, и корреспондирующая обязанность государства не определены достаточно конкретно, и, следовательно, государство имеет широкий выбор средств, чтобы осуществление права стало возможным и эффективным".
v) Все рассуждения, содержащиеся в п. 44, не приводят к желаемому выводу; лишь наполовину верные, они не дают ответа на основной вопрос, который надлежит решить.
20. Пункт 44 Решения Суда, очевидно, основывается на точке зрения, выраженной в бельгийском деле о языках, на которое он ссылается и некоторые из формулировок которого в нем приводятся. Я допускаю, что, возможно, будет трудно отойти от выводов, к которым Суд пришел в деле, завоевавшем такой большой авторитет. Однако Суд, подобно всем международным судебным органам, и в отличие от некоторых национальных, не связан прецедентом; и если возникнут серьезные основания для сомнения в правильности какой-либо ранее выраженной точки зрения, Суд должен, не колеблясь, заново рассмотреть вопрос. По моему мнению, точка зрения, выраженная в деле о языках, была совершенно неправильной; но прежде чем дать свои комментарии, я приведу важное место из того Решения, которое без ссылки цитируется в п. 44 данного Решения Суда. Говоря о гарантиях, предусмотренных статьей 14 Конвенции, Суд в его тогдашнем составе высказался в деле о языках следующим образом (с. 33 - 34, п. 9 Решения): "Хотя эта гарантия действительно не имеет самостоятельного значения, в том смысле, что статья 14 лишь указывает на права и свободы, предусмотренные в Конвенции, однако соответствующая статья, устанавливающая право или свободу, может в сочетании со статьей 14 оказаться нарушенной, если меры, связанные с этими правами и свободами, приобретают дискриминационный характер".
Применительно к бельгийскому делу о языках это означает, что государство не было обязано создавать "особый вид учебных заведений"; но, если тем не менее государство фактически создало учебное заведение, оно не имело права, "устанавливая правила приема", применять дискриминационные критерии.
Суд привел тогда следующий пример: "Государство не обязано создавать то или иное учебное заведение, но если оно объявляет о его создании, оно не может, определяя правила приема в него, устанавливать дискриминационные критерии" (п. 33 - 34 Решения <*>).
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<*> Решение от 23 июля 1968 г. Серия A, т. 6.
Суд обратился и к другому примеру.
"Статья 6 Конвенции не принуждает государство создать двухинстанционную судебную систему. Если оно тем не менее создаст апелляционные суды, то это лежит за пределами его обязанностей по статье 6. Но государство нарушит статью 6 в сочетании со статьей 14, если оно откажет кому-либо без правомерных оснований в праве на обжалование, в то время как другие имеют такое право.
В подобных случаях имеет место нарушение гарантированного права или свободы, которое в обстоятельствах данного дела оказалось связанным с требованиями статьи 14 таким образом, что эта статья становится как бы составной частью каждой из статей, говорящих о каких-либо конкретных правах или свободах".
Это мнение представляется мне не только очевидно ошибочным, но и внутренне противоречивым. Я покажу это на примере с апелляционными судами.
Когда Суд говорит, что статья 14 инкорпорируется в статьи Конвенции, которые придают какое-либо право или свободу, это означает, что соответствующее право должно быть действительно признанным, чтобы возникла обязанность не допускать его дискриминации. Однако Суд заявляет, что статья 6 не обязывает государство создать судебную систему из двух инстанций и соответственно у лица нет права требовать ее создания. Это в свою очередь означает, что отсутствует право, "признанное Конвенцией", которое предполагает применение статьи 14. Отсутствует право, при осуществлении которого можно требовать запрета дискриминации. Тем более что в данном случае речь шла бы о пользовании правом, его запрете или дискриминации, которые установлены не Конвенцией, а добровольно самим государством.
21. Поэтому можно убедиться, что в деле о языках Суд просто противоречил себе, когда, с одной стороны, он постулировал случай отсутствия нарушения статьи 6, поскольку она не влекла обязанности (и, следовательно, соответствующего ей права) ввести систему апелляций, и, с другой стороны, полагал, что возможно нарушение статьи 14, хотя и признал, что в данном случае дискриминация не касалась никакого права или свободы, признанных в Конвенции, как этого требует статья 14 <*>.
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<*> Как я упомянул ранее, понятие "свобода" фактически бессмысленно в этом контексте. Каждый человек свободен призывать к чему угодно, но это не ведет к созданию юридически значимой ситуации. Особенно бессмысленно говорить о свободе требовать введения системы апелляционных судов.
22. Вряд ли необходимо сосредоточиваться на столь элементарной ситуации, но тем не менее полезно представить ее и в другом ракурсе. Поскольку приведенное извлечение из дела о языках применительно к нарушению любой статьи Конвенции "в сочетании" со статьей 14, возникает вопрос: что же служит связующим звеном между этими статьями? Если ни одна статья Конвенции не содержит право или свободу, в отношении которых предполагается дискриминация, то нет оснований для какой-либо связи со статьей 14. В таком случае не может иметь место нарушение какой-либо иной статьи "в сочетании" со статьей 14, ибо установлено, что она не содержит соответствующее право или свободу, в то время как Суд правомерно установил в деле о языках, что "гарантия", предусмотренная статьей 14, "не имеет никакого независимого существования", поскольку она имеет отношение исключительно к "правам и свободам, признанным в Конвенции". Как тогда Суд мог вынести Решение о том, что имело место нарушение статьи 2 Протокола N 1 "в сочетании со статьей 14"? Сложение двух отрицательных величин не может дать положительной. Не может быть никакого кумулятивного эффекта, когда каждая из статей, взятая в отдельности, несоединима с другой; здесь нет необходимой связи, потому что ни одна из статей не дает никакого основания для ее возникновения. Недостаточно показать, что статья 11 представляет собой статью, которая имеет отношение в принципе или в общем смысле к деятельности профсоюза, или что предмет данного спора находится в сфере прав или интересов профсоюза. Именно на это Суд опирается в настоящем деле, но этого недостаточно. Чтобы восполнить пробел, необходимо показать, что оспариваемое конкретное право - в этом случае право на участие в консультациях - является правом, предоставленным статьей 11 как часть такой деятельности. Согласно заключению Суда этого-то и нет. Следовательно, консультации не являются одним из вопросов, к которым статья 14 имеет отношение.
23. Этот анализ можно и нужно развивать далее. Действительно, было бы ошибочно вообще говорить о нарушении статьи 6, статьи 11 и т.д. в связи со статьей 14, поскольку вся суть статьи 14 состоит в том, что она действует даже тогда, когда нет никакого нарушения другой соответствующей статьи, при условии, что эта другая статья предоставляет право или свободу, при осуществлении которых имеет место дискриминация. В этом состоит реальная цель статьи 14. Обычно нет никакой необходимости прибегать к этой статье, если сама по себе была нарушена другая соответствующая статья, независимо от того, имела ли место какая-либо дискриминация. В таком случае дискриминация только бы усугубила нарушение, она не была бы его причиной. Для применения статьи 14 не требуется нарушения права или свободы, а лишь признание их существования другими статьями Конвенции; ее действие направлено на то, чтобы выявлять случаи, когда предусмотренные какой-либо другой статьей права или свободы предоставляются, но дискриминационным образом.
24. Все эти рассуждения одновременно отвечают на возражение, согласно которому признание моей точки зрения правильной означает, что статья 14 бесполезна и ничего не добавляет к другим статьям. На самом деле она, конечно, дает многое. Предположим, что статья 11 предоставляет-таки профсоюзным организациям право требовать, чтобы Правительство консультировалось с ними. Тогда действие статьи 14 заключалось бы в том, что недостаточно было бы просто предоставить данное право и исполнить соответствующее обязательство, в дополнение ко всему это необходимо осуществить без какой-либо дискриминации. В противном случае, несмотря на то, что, возможно, не имело места никакое нарушение статьи 11, произойдет нарушение статьи 14. Именно так действует статья 14, хотя только тогда, когда существует основное право, вытекающее из статьи 11. Как следствие, если учесть это непреложное условие (но не иначе), статья 14 имеет весьма определенную и важную сферу применения и, по моему мнению, никоим образом не должна рассматриваться как мертвая буква закона. Без нее, пока не нарушено само право, дискриминация была бы допустимой.
25. В заключительной части (если не считать отдельного пункта, рассматриваемого в последнем пункте ниже) приходим к выводу, что то, чем в данном деле занимался Суд (и то же самое относится к делу о языках), так это такое толкование и применение статьи 14, как будто слова "признанные в настоящей Конвенции" в ней вообще отсутствуют, а начинается она со слов "пользование [всеми] правами и свободами обеспечивается..." и т.д. Но тогда в результате этого (вопреки правильному решению в деле о языках и собственному утверждению Суда во втором предложении первого абзаца п. 44 Решения Суда) данная статья стала бы самостоятельной, автономной нормой, которая запрещает дискриминацию во всей сфере прав человека. Такой подход, возможно, имеет свои положительные черты, и может появиться соблазн пойти по этому пути. Все же естественное и похвальное неприятие дискриминации в любой форме не может оправдать вывод, для которого не существует или не может существовать никакой достаточной правовой основы. Суд является не судом этики, а судом закона.
26. Чтобы ничего не упустить, замечу, что имеется еще одна категория доводов в пользу принятого Судом Решения - доводы более широкого порядка, основанные скорее на общих принципах, чем на конкретных нормах Конвенции. При толковании и применении конкретных норм почти всегда можно сказать: а нельзя ли применить в данной связи общие принципы права, поскольку есть основания полагать, что они имеют отношение к данному делу, а само оно четко не исключает такую возможность. Отталкиваясь от этого, можно представить такую ситуацию. Какое-то лицо, не обязанное что-то делать, тем не менее сделало это для другого лица: значит ли это, что оно должно сделать то же самое для всех других заинтересованных лиц, чтобы никто не выиграл и не проиграл? Независимо от того, получит ли подобная доктрина признание в других ситуациях или нет, она не может быть противопоставлена четкому тексту Конвенции, который ограничивает обязанность не прибегать к дискриминационным мерам только теми правами и свободами, которые "признаны в Конвенции". Короче говоря, Конвенция исключает применение этой доктрины. Давайте также не будем забывать урок одной из самых старых притч нашей цивилизации - притчи о работниках на винограднике. Когда те, кто "вынес жару и бремя дневного времени", пожаловались на дискриминацию, потому что им заплатили не больше, чем заплатили нанятым в конце дня, хозяин виноградника ответил: "Друг, я не делаю тебе ничего плохого... Возьми, что твое, и иди своей дорогой... разве мне не позволено сделать то, что я хочу делать с тем, что мне принадлежит?" ("Евангелие от Матфея", глава 20, стих 13 - 15). С точки зрения этики это не выглядит так уж идеально, но может ли этика требовать так много, не говоря уже о праве. Если я хочу помочь своему соседу привести в порядок его сад, то подразумевает ли это, что либо в силу закона, либо согласно этическим нормам я должен сделать то же самое для всех других жителей улицы?
Добровольные действия типа консультаций с профсоюзной организацией могут быть предметом обоснованных обвинений в дискриминации, противоречащей закону, только если это установлено правовой нормой. В настоящем деле применяемой правовой нормой являются нормы Конвенции или нормы, вытекающие из нее, а согласно Конвенции консультации не являются обязательными, а отсутствие консультаций не составляет нарушения какой-либо из статей Конвенции. Как тогда может консультация с одним из профсоюзов и отказ от проведения ее с другими, даже если считать это дискриминацией, быть нарушением права по Конвенции, если она сама никакого права на консультации не гарантирует?



EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
CASE OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF BELGIAN POLICE
JUDGMENT
(Strasbourg, 27.X.1975)
In the case of the National Union of Belgian Police,
The European Court of Human Rights, taking its decision in plenary session in application of Rule 48 of the Rules of Court and composed of the following judges:
MM. G. Balladore Pallieri, President,
H. Mosler,
A. Verdross,
E. Rodenbourg,
M. Zekia,
J. Cremona,
G. Wiarda,
P. O"Donoghue,
Mrs. H. Pedersen,
MM. T. {Vilhjalmsson},
R. Ryssdal,
W. Ganshof van der Meersch,
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice,
Mrs. D. Bindschedler-Robert,
and also Mr. M.-A. Eissen, Registrar and Mr. H. Petzold, Deputy Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 10 and 12 May and from 29 September to 1 October 1975,
Delivers the following judgment which was adopted on the last-mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case of the National Union of Belgian Police (Syndicat national de la police belge) was referred to the Court by the European Commission of Human Rights (hereinafter called "the Commission"). The case has its origin in an application against the Kingdom of Belgium lodged with the Commission by the National Union of Belgian Police on 5 March 1970.
2. The Commission"s request, to which was attached the report provided for under Article 31 (art. 31) of the Convention, was lodged with the registry of the Court on 7 October 1974, within the period of three months laid down by Articles 32 para. 1 and 47 (art. 32-1, art. 47). The request referred to Articles 44 and 48 (art. 44, art. 48) and to the declaration made by the Kingdom of Belgium recognising the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46) (art. 46). The purpose of the Commission"s request is to obtain a decision from the Court as to whether or not the facts of the case disclose, on the part of the Kingdom of Belgium, a violation of the obligations binding on it under Articles 11 and 14 (art. 11, art. 14) of the Convention.
3. On 15 October 1974, the President of the Court drew by lot, in the presence of the Registrar, the names of five of the seven judges called upon to sit as members of the Chamber, Mr. W. Ganshof van der Meersch, the elected judge of Belgian nationality, and Mr. G. Balladore Pallieri, the President of the Court, being ex officio members under Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention and Rule 21 para. 3 (b) of the Rules of the Court respectively. The five judges chosen were Mr. A. Favre, Mr. G. Wiarda, Mr. P. O"Donoghue, Mr. T. {Vilhjalmsson} and Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice (Article 43 in fine of the Convention and Rule 21 para. 4) (art. 43).
Mr. Balladore Pallieri assumed the office of President of the Chamber in accordance with Rule 21 para. 5.
4. The President of the Chamber ascertained, through the Registrar, the views of the Agent of the Belgian Government (hereinafter called "the Government") and of the Delegates of the Commission regarding the procedure to be followed. By an Order of 30 October 1974, the President of the Chamber decided that the Government should file a memorial within a time-limit expiring on 31 January 1975 and that the Delegates should be entitled to file a memorial in reply within two months of the receipt of the Government"s memorial.
The Government"s memorial was received at the registry on 29 January, and that of the Delegates on 25 March 1975.
5. After having consulted, through the Registrar, the Agent of the Government and the Delegates of the Commission, the President decided by an Order of 26 March 1975 that the oral hearings should open on 7 May.
6. At a meeting held in private on 12 April 1975 in Paris, the Chamber decided under Rule 48 to relinquish jurisdiction forthwith in favour of the plenary Court, "considering that the case raise(d) serious questions affecting the interpretation of the Convention ...". On the same day, the President instructed the Registrar to request the Agent of the Government and the Delegates of the Commission to communicate certain documents to the Court. These documents were received at the registry on 18 and 28 April 1975 respectively.
7. After having consulted, through the Registrar, the Agent of the Government and the Delegates of the Commission, the President of the Court decided by an Order of 16 April 1975 that the opening of the oral hearings should be deferred until 8 May.
8. On 7 May 1975, the Court held a preparatory meeting to consider the oral stage of the procedure. On this occasion the Court decided proprio motu in pursuance of Rules 38 para. 1 and 48 para. 3 taken together, that during the oral hearings it would hear, on certain questions of fact and for the purpose of information, Mr. {Felix} Janssens, administrateur {delegue} and Secretary General of the applicant union.
9. The oral hearings were held in public at the Human Rights Building at Strasbourg on 8 and 9 May 1975.
There appeared before the Court:
- for the Government:
Mr. J. Niset, Legal Adviser at the Ministry of Justice, Agent;
Mr. A. Houtekier, Barrister,
Mr. J. de Meyer, Professor at the University of Louvain, Counsel;
Mr. V. Crabbe, Inspector General of Public Services,
Mr. C. Dumortier, Principal Adviser at the Ministry of the Interior, Advisers;
- for the Commission:
Mr. J.E.S. Fawcett, Principal Delegate,
Mr. J. Custers, Delegate,
Mr. J.M. Nelissen, who had represented the applicant before the Commission, assisting the delegates under Rule 29 para. 1, second sentence.
In accordance with its decision of 7 May 1975, the Court heard Mr. Janssens on the following day. The Court then heard the addresses and submissions of Mr. Houtekier and Mr. De Meyer for the Government and of Mr. Fawcett, Mr. Custers and Mr. Nelissen for the Commission, as well as their replies to questions put by the Court and by several judges.
10. On 28 May, leave having been granted by the Court, Mr. Janssens replied in writing to two questions which the Court had put to him on 8 May 1975 when he had not been in a position to supply the necessary details immediately. His reply was communicated to the Delegates of the Commission and to the Government and gave rise on the part of the latter to written observations which were received at the registry on 18 June 1975.
On 22 August 1975, the Secretary to the Commission forwarded to the Registrar certain comments from the applicant union on those observations. On 26 August, the Registrar communicated these comments to the Government which informed him, on 16 September, that it did not think it necessary to revert to the explanations it had earlier given to the Court.
AS TO THE FACTS
11. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows:
12. The applicant, the National Union of Belgian Police, has its headquarters at Brussels-Schaerbeek. The union descends from the Belgian Police Federation founded in 1922 and changed its name in 1930; in 1939 it was constituted in the form of a non-profit-making association within the meaning of the Act of 27 June 1921. Associations of this kind have capacity in civil law.
13. The applicant union is open to all members of the municipal police, including rural policemen, regardless of rank, but members of the two State police forces, the criminal police attached to the prosecuting authorities (police judiciaire {pres} les parquets) and the gendarmerie, may not at present belong to it. It numbers police superintendents and deputy superintendents amongst its members.
The list of the applicant union"s members deposited on 21 July 1971, in accordance with law, contained the names of 99 persons; this was not the whole of its membership but only the "active members", that is to say, those "who are delegated by the sections to represent them at the general meeting" and are alone entitled to vote (Article 5 of the applicant union"s articles of association annexed to the Moniteur belge of 8 July 1960). The applicant union claims to have had 7,226 paid-up members in 1961 and that their numbers fell to 6,162 in 1971, 6,011 in 1972, 5,896 in 1973 and 5,748 in 1974. It is alleged by the applicant union that this steep decline of some 20% was due specially to the trade union consultation policy contested in the present case. The Government does not dispute the fact of the decline but does not attribute it to the cause put forward by the applicant.
There being about 12,000 men serving in the municipal police - whose establishment provides for 13,722 -, at the end of 1974 the applicant union represented almost half of the members of the force.
14. The municipal police, whose members are classified as municipal officials, is entrusted both with functions of an administrative and crime-deterrent character, as well as with criminal-police functions. In carrying out its administrative and crime-deterrent duties, the municipal police is directly subject to the municipal authorities and placed under the orders of the burgomasters; on the other hand, in the exercise of its criminal-police functions, it is subject solely to the authority of the State and more especially the judicial authorities ({autorites} judiciaires).
The two State police forces are distinct from the municipal police. The gendarmerie, itself also vested with both administrative police duties (maintenance of order) and criminal-police duties, can in addition discharge military duties in certain circumstances and is organised on military lines. The criminal police attached to the prosecuting authorities (la police judiciaire {pres} les parquets) has, for its part, exclusively criminal-police (de police judiciaire) duties.
The municipal police force amounts to some 13% of municipal staff and less than 10% of all municipal and provincial staff. At the end of 1974, municipal staff totalled 88,809 officials to which number were added the staff of municipal social welfare boards (28,999), inter-communal associations (12,156) and provinces (14,260). The gendarmerie and criminal police numbered respectively 13,392 and 827 members as of 30 June 1970.
15. Under Article 3 of its articles of association, the aim of the applicant union is "any activity directly or indirectly relating to the study, protection, development, improvement and progress of any matter concerning the rights and occupational interests of the Belgian police, particularly by means of trade union action."
16. Freedom of association is recognised in Belgium by Article 20 of the Constitution and is guaranteed in all fields by the Act of 24 May 1921. Furthermore, Belgium is a party to International Labour Organisation Conventions no. 87 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (Act of 13 July 1951) and no. 98 concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively (Act of 20 November 1953). These various provisions safeguard, inter alia, the right freely to form trade unions, the right to join or not to join them, the right of trade union members freely to elect trade union representatives and the right of trade unions freely to organise their administration.
While therefore in Belgian law freedom is the rule for trade unions in matters of founding, organising, recruitment and propaganda, the same is not true of consultation of trade unions by public authorities acting as employers. In order to avoid having to negotiate with an ever increasing number of parties, the public authorities have in fact fixed certain criteria for selection based on the idea of representativeness of trade unions. They have also introduced this principle in several Acts dealing with relations between employees and employers in the private sector, for example the Act of 17 July 1957 on the Health and Safety of Workers and the Hygiene of Places of Work and Working Conditions, the Act of 29 May 1962 setting up a National Labour Council and the Act of 5 December 1968 on Collective Labour Agreements and Joint Committees.
17. Apart from a Decree of 26 September 1946 referred to below (paragraph 19), the first regulation on trade union consultation in the public sector dates back to a Royal Decree of 20 June 1955 applicable to State officials exclusively. The Royal Decree confines consultation to organisations having a seat on a "trade union advisory committee" set up within each ministerial department and a seat in a "general trade union advisory committee" operating under the aegis of the Prime Minister. These committees are consulted on all proposals concerning the status of State officials, organisation of services and work, safety, health and improvement of places of work.
The representative character of these trade unions is assessed at two levels, first at the level of the different ministerial departments and secondly at the level of the State administration as a whole. The sole criterion for representativeness is the number of members, determined by elections held in principle every four years. In fact, the last trade union elections were held in 1959. The elections due to be held in 1963 were postponed sine die at the request of the large trade union federations, which had obtained a low percentage of votes in 1959.
In the case of the criminal police attached to the prosecuting authorities, the Government has reserved the benefit of consultation for the organisations which are confined to members of this force (Royal Decree of 21 February 1956); the Government states that in fact these organisations are in turn affiliated to the three large Belgian trade union federations. As regards the gendarmerie, Section 16 para. 2 of the Act of 14 January 1975 provides that members of the gendarmerie may join only occupational associations composed solely of gendarmes. The National Staff Union of the gendarmerie has been recognised as the sole organisation representing members of the corps.
18. There are no general regulations governing relations of municipal and provincial authorities with trade unions. The municipal authorities are free to set up trade union consultation if they so wish. Some of them, such as the towns of Antwerp, Charleroi, Mons and Verviers, have done so and set up commitees - generally organised like those which operate at national level - on which sit delegates of certain representative trade union organisations. Otherwise there is no organised consultation but trade unions may, as everywhere else in the country, lodge claims or make representations on behalf of a member without any condition of representativeness.
19. The position proves to be very different as regards relations between the Ministry of the Interior, which is the supervisory authority, and the staff of municipalities and provinces.
After a first attempt (a Bill of 1957) had failed, trade union consultation was introduced at this level by an Act of 27 July 1961. Prior to that there had been no statutory provisions. A Decree issued by the Regent on 26 September 1946 had set up a trade union consultative committee at the Ministry of the Interior. On this committee there were, amongst others, delegates of the Union of National Associations of Civil Servants and Municipal Officials, including the secretary general of the applicant union; but the Government states that the commitee was of little importance and soon ceased to meet.
20. Section 9 of the Act of 27 July 1961 reads as follows: "The general arrangements to be made by the King ... shall be decreed after consulting representatives of those organisations that best represent the staff of the provinces and municipalities... The forms of such consultation shall be determined by the King."
Under the same section the representative organisations are to be consulted on the following subjects: staffing, recruitment and promotion conditions for municipal staff, pecuniary status and salary scales for the staff of provinces and municipalities, general rules governing certain allowances and bonuses, rules governing the adjustment of pay scales and pecuniary status in line with the changes which have occurred since 1 January 1960 in the pecuniary status of staff of the ministries, conditions for appointment to the posts of police superintendent and deputy superintendent and criteria for up-grading.
21. Consultation is important on two counts. First, the Government is bound to ask for the opinion of the representative organisations and, secondly, in the course of consultation it informs the representative organisations of its proposals in order that they may make known their opinions before any decision is reached.
The consultation machinery is set in motion for the preparation of every rule-making instrument - Bill, Royal Decree, ministerial decree or circular - which relates to the matters listed above. Royal Decrees and ministerial circulars have been formulated in this way, usually concerning the entire staff of provinces and municipalities, but several of them containing measures peculiar to the municipal police and some valid only for that force.
22. If an organisation is not recognised as representative, it is barred from the consultation procedure but may nonetheless, inter alia, submit claims to the supervisory authority, ask to be heard by it, refer cases to it and make representations on behalf of its members.
23. The modalities of consultation of trade unions recognised as representative were first fixed by a Royal Decree of 23 October 1961. This Decree set up a trade union consultation committee attached to the Ministry of the Interior, on which the only trade union delegates were the representatives of the four large trade union federations listed in the following paragraph (Article 2).
The applicant union applied to the Conseil d"Etat for a declaration of annulment of the Decree. However, on the day of the hearing, 15 October 1964, the Moniteur belge published a Royal Decree of 12 October 1964 withdrawing the provision which was being challenged. The case was then removed from the list of the Conseil d"Etat.
24. A Royal Decree of 2 August 1966 re-organised the trade union consultation in question. While the consultation committee remained, its membership was radically changed in respect of both the number and appointment of representatives. The representatives were no longer to be appointed by specified trade unions but by "the organisations most representative of the staff of the provinces and municipalities". Article 2 para. 2 specified what was to be understood by "most representative":
"Those organisations which are open to all staff of the provinces and municipalities and which protect such staff"s occupational interests shall be deemed to be the organisations most representative thereof.
Each such organisation shall make itself known by sending to the Minister of the Interior by registered post, within forty days of publication of this Decree in the Moniteur belge, a copy of its articles of association and a list of its officers. The Minister of the Interior shall verify whether it complies with the conditions required and shall notify it of his decision."
Four trade unions, of which the first two have since merged, were recognised as meeting these criteria: the Liberal Union of Civil Servants; the Liberal Public Services Union (a member of the Affiliated Belgian Trade Unions); the Affiliated Public Services Unions, Provincial and Municipal Sector (a member of the Belgian General Federation of Labour); and the Affiliated Christian Public Services Unions, Provincial and Municipal Sector (a member of the Christian Trade Unions).
It is difficult to specify the number of persons affiliated in these various organisations. Some of the applicant union"s members are also affiliated to one or other of the large federations. The Government says that two of these federations have 1,500 policemen as members.
At least two of the trade union organisations recognised as representative have technical committees for the municipal police, which, as occasion arises, deal with problems particular to this force.
25. On 22 September 1966, the applicant union asked the Minister of the Interior to consider it as one of the most representative organisations of staff of provinces and municipalities for the purposes of the implementation of the above-mentioned Royal Decree. By letter of 14 February 1967 the Minister replied as follows: "From the documents you have submitted it does not appear that your organisation fulfils the required conditions, namely that it should be open to all the staff of the provinces and municipalities and protect such staff"s occupational interests".
26. Prior to that, on 25 October 1966, the applicant union had applied to the Conseil d"Etat for a declaration of annulment of the Royal Decree of 2 August 1966, alleging that Section 9 of the Act of 27 July 1961 had been contravened. The applicant contended that Section 9, which was drafted in very wide terms, implied that the organisations grouping officials by category and without regard for their opinions should, subject to their being the most representative organisations, be consulted on an equal footing with the organisations in which officials joined together according to their political feelings and without distinction as to their occupations. In the applicant"s view, the preparatory work to Section 9 showed that consultation should extend to every representative organisation which protected the occupational interests of staff governed by particular staff regulations. Claiming that three quarters of the men in the municipal police belonged to it and that the force had its own regulations and constituted a corps within the personnel of the municipalities; the applicant thus maintained that it was representative in a twofold way, the number of its members as compared with the number of municipal policemen and the special character of their functions. In the submission of the applicant, the King had acted ultra vires in stipulating that the condition "representative" must be confined to organisations open to the whole of provincial and municipal staff.
The applicant union did not refer to Articles 11 and 14 (art. 11, art. 14) of the Convention nor to Article 20 of the Belgian Constitution. It submitted, however, albeit in a subsidiary way, that Article 2 para. 2 of the Royal Decree violated the principle of trade union freedom in that it made it "obligatory" for police officers to join "political" trade unions.
27. The Minister of the Interior submitted in reply that Section 9 para. 1 of the Act of 27 July 1961 provided explicitly for consultation of the organisations most representative of the staff of the provinces and municipalities. The Minister added that the Conseil d"Etat, in its opinion no. L 94 38/2, had taken the view that there was no objection to considering as the most representative organisations those which "included staff members of all categories". The Minister inferred from this that the application was ill-founded.
28. The Conseil d"Etat dismissed the application on 6 November 1969. It held that "while the criterion of number advanced by the applicant was acceptable when applied to workers in the private sector or even to civil servants and officials in large government departments belonging to the same hierarchical structure and subject to the same regulations, it cannot be accepted in the present case since the officers concerned belong to widely different categories which have no link between them, some being governed by separate regulations". It further considered "that this diversity of categories and regulations has the effect of making the consultation of organisations representing staff much more difficult; that, in each category, the persons concerned will tend to claim as many advantages as possible for themselves without paying any heed to the implications of measures on which they are consulted for the position of the other staff members, whereas the authority has to take such implications into account; that the consultation of the organisations by the Government cannot in most cases serve any useful purpose unless it concerns organisations which comprise staff belonging to all categories and which therefore have to strike some balance in their claims in order to protect the interests of all their members". It found "that in considering the organisations representing the occupational interests of all staff of the provinces and municipalities to be the organisations most representative of such staff, the Decree being challenged is not contrary to the intention of the statute"; "that the applicant is in error in still maintaining that the contested provision is contrary to the principle of trade union freedom by making it obligatory for police officers to join political trade unions; that in fact the contested provision does not oblige police officers to join any trade union nor any particular trade union."
The judgment ended with the conclusion "that in the organisation of public services the King may confine the consultation of occupational organisations to whichever organisations are the most representative of the staff as a whole, which procedure has repeatedly been given statutory confirmation" (translated from Recueil des {arrets} et avis du Conseil d"Etat, 1969, pp. 941 - 942).
29. In the meantime a Royal Decree of 20 August 1969 had abolished the committee provided for in the Decree of 2 August 1966, but preserved consultation of the most representative organisations as provided in Article 2 para. 2 of the 1966 Decree; since then, such consultation takes place in writing.
30. An Act of 19 December 1974 re-organised the relations between public authorities and trade unions of officials in the service of those authorities. Section I of this Act provides that the system which the Act establishes may be made applicable by the King - with certain exceptions one of which concerns the "members of the armed forces" - not only to the staff "of the administration and other government departments", particularly of the "services which assist the judicial authorities (pouvoir judiciaire)", but also to the staff of the provinces and municipalities including the municipal police.
The Act establishes a procedure of negotiation (Chapter II) and a procedure of consultation (Chapter III).
For negotiation, the Act provides that the King shall establish three "general committees" namely, "the Committee for the National Public Services", "the Committee for Provincial and Local Public Services", and "the Joint Committee for all Public Services" (Section 3), as well as "special committees" among which will be committees competent for "questions relating to the staff" of provincial or municipal services (Section 4). The King shall determine "the composition and operation" of these committees (Section 5) on which only "representative ... organisations" shall sit from the trade union side (Section 6). Section 7 defines in detail the criteria of representativeness for each of the three general committees, Section 8 for the special committees.
Consultation shall take place within "consultation committees" set up by the King for "services and groups of services comprising not less than twenty-five officials" (Section 10). Section 12 provides that "the trade union organisations represented on a special negotiating committee shall be entitled to appoint delegates to sit on the consultation committees set up within the competence of that committee".
There will be negotiations on "the basic regulations" concerning "staff administration matters", "pecuniary status", "pension schemes", "relations with trade union organisations", and "the organisation of the social services"; on "regulations, internal measures, or directives, of a general nature relating to the subsequent fixing of staff structures, to working hours or to the organisation of work"; lastly, on Bills concerning any of these various matters (Section 2). There will be consultation for "decisions determining the staff structure of the services covered by the consultation committee in question", "regulations which the King has not specified as basic regulations", etc. (Section 11).
In its observations of 18 February 1975, the applicant union expressed the opinion that the present case would "probably become pointless" "if the Act of 19 December 1974 became applicable to municipal officials".
At hearings of 8 and 9 May 1975, the Government stressed that the application of the 1974 Act to provincial and municipal staff would not be an easy matter and would require more time. The Government consider that it may in any case be inferred from the text and the preparatory work of the Act that even when it becomes applicable to such staff it will not change the trade union status in a way favourable to category-based unions. In its view, the applicant union will not be entitled to sit on a general or special negotiating committee.
The applicant accordingly now feels that "it is doubtful wether the new law will give just satisfaction to the union" and has so informed the Court through the Commission.
31. In its application lodged with the Commission on 5 March 1970, the National Union of Belgian Police alleged violation of Articles 11 and 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 17 (art. 17 + 11, art. 17 + 14), in that the Belgian authorities refused to recognise it as a representative organisation, thus debarring it from the consultation provided for by the Act of 27 July 1961. The union also claimed damages which it provisionally assessed at 100,000 Belgian francs.
The Commission declared the application admissible by a final decision of 8 February 1972, after having rejected on 28 May 1971 certain of the preliminary objections made by the respondent Government.
During the examination of the merits the applicant union confined itself to relying on Article 11 (art. 11), both on its own and in conjunction with Article 14 (art. 14 + 11).
32. In its report of 27 May 1974, the Commission expressed the opinion:
- unanimously, that the State, whether acting as "legislator" or "employer", assumes obligations within the scope of Article 11 para. 1 (art. 11-1) of the Convention;
- by eight votes to five, that the right to consultation and, more generally, freedom to bargain collectively are important and even essential elements of trade union action falling within the scope of Article 11 para. 1 (art. 11-1);
- by eight votes to five, that this right to consultation is not however unlimited, the limit being, in the case of the applicant union, the existence of an objective criterion for representativeness;
- unanimously, that the regulations at issue on trade union consultation in Belgium do not constitute a breach of Article 11 para. 1 (art. 11-1) of the Convention;
- unanimously, that the difference in treatment introduced by Belgian legislation between different categories of unions is justified in the circumstances of the case and is consistent with Articles 11 and 14 (art. 14 + 11) of the Convention taken together.
The report contains a separate concurring opinion to which four other members of the Commission subscribed.
33. The Government made the following final submissions at the oral hearing on 8 May 1975 in the afternoon:
"May it please the Court:
- in the first place, Article 11 (art. 11) does not apply in the present case and there is therefore no reason to consider whether there has been violation of Article 14, taken in conjunction with Article 11 (art. 14 + 11);
- alternatively, there has been violation neither of Article 11, (art. 11), nor of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 11 (art. 14 + 11)."
AS TO THE LAW
34. The applicant"s complaints may be summarised as follows:
The National Union of Belgian Police complains of the Government not recognising it as one of the most representative organisations that the Ministry of the Interior is required to consult under the Act of 27 July 1961, which relates to such matters as staff structures, conditions of recruitment and promotion, pecuniary status and salary scales of provincial and municipal staff. The applicant union, which is excluded from this consultation as regards both questions of interest to all such staff and questions peculiar to the municipal police, considers that it is put at a disadvantage compared with the three trade unions open to that staff as a whole, as defined in Article 2 para. 2 of the Royal Decree of 2 August 1966. The applicant submits that this provision greatly restricts its field of action, thereby tending to oblige the members of the municipal police to join the organisations considered to be "representative" but having a "political" character incompatible with the "special vocation" of the police. The applicant union further maintains that the Government has, on the other hand, agreed to take account of this special vocation in the case of the two other police forces, wich are subject to State authority, namely the criminal police attached to the prosecuting authorities (Royal Decree of 21 February 1956) and the gendarmerie (letter of 17 March 1972 and subsequently the Act of 14 January 1975).
On these various points, the applicant relies on Article 11 (art. 11) of the Convention, considered both on its own and in conjunction with Article 14 (art. 14 + 11).
35. Having come to the conclusion that there was no violation of the Convention, the Commission referred the case to the Court, emphasising the importance of the questions that arose therein on the interpretation and application of those two Articles (art. 11, art. 14).
36. Having regard to the information at its disposal concerning the Act of 19 December 1974 and its state of application (paragraph 30 above), the Court considers that there is no call in the present case to take account of the said Act; moreover, neither the Commission nor the Government have invited the Court to decide the case on the basis of this Act.
I. On the alleged violation of Article 11 (art. 11)
37. Article 11 para. 1 (art. 11-1) of the Convention reads: "Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests."
38. The majority of the Commission has expressed the opinion that the essential components of trade union activity, which in its view include the right to be consulted, come within the scope of the provision cited above.
The Court notes that while Article 11 para. 1 (art. 11-1) presents trade union freedom as one form or a special aspect of freedom of association, the Article (art. 11) does not guarantee any particular treatment of trade unions, or their members, by the State, such as the right to be consulted by it. Not only is this latter right not mentioned in Article 11 para. 1 (art. 11-1), but neither can it be said that all the Contracting States in general incorporate it in their national law or practice, or that it is indispensable for the effective enjoyment of trade union freedom. It is thus not an element necessarily inherent in a right guaranteed by the Convention, which distinguishes it from the "right to a court" embodied in Article 6 (art. 6) (Golder judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A no. 18, p. 18, para. 36).
In addition, trade union matters are dealt with in detail in another convention, also drawn up within the framework of the Council of Europe, namely the Social Charter of 18 October 1961. Article 6 para. 1 of the Charter binds the Contracting States "to promote joint consultation between workers and employers". The prudence of the terms used shows that the Charter does not provide for a real right to consultation. Besides, Article 20 permits a ratifying State not to accept the undertaking in Article 6 para. 1. Thus it cannot be supposed that such a right derives by implication from Article 11 para. 1 (art. 11-1) of the 1950 Convention, which incidentally would amount to admitting that the 1961 Charter took a retrograde step in this domain.
39. The Court does not, however, share the view expressed by the minority in the Commission who describe the phrase "for the protection of his interests" as redundant. These words, clearly denoting purpose, show that the Convention safeguards freedom to protect the occupational interests of trade union members by trade union action, the conduct and development of which the Contracting States must both permit and make possible. In the opinion of the Court, it follows that the members of a trade union have a right, in order to protect their interests, that the trade union should be heard. Article 11 para. 1 (art. 11-1) certainly leaves each State a free choice of the means to be used towards this end. While consultation is one of these means, there are others. What the Convention requires is that under national law trade unions should be enabled, in conditions not at variance with Article 11 (art. 11), to strive for the protection of their members" interests.
40. No-one disputes the fact that the applicant union can engage in various kinds of activity {vis-a-vis} the Government. It is open to it, for instance, to present claims and to make representations for the protection of the interests of its members or certain of them. Nor does the applicant union in any way allege that the steps it takes are ignored by the Government. In these circumstances, the fact alone that the Minister of the Interior does not consult the applicant under the Act of 27 July 1961 does not constitute a breach of Article 11 para. 1 (art. 11-1) considered on its own.
41. As regards the alleged infringement of personal freedom to join or remain a member of the applicant union, the Court stresses the fact that every member of the municipal police retains this freedom as of a right, notwithstanding the Royal Decree of 2 August 1966. It may be the fact that the steady and appreciable decline in the membership of the National Union of Belgian Police is to be explained at least in part, as the applicant maintains, by the disadvantage the applicant is placed at compared with trade unions enjoying a more favourable position. It may be the fact too that this state of affairs is capable of diminishing the usefulness and practical value of belonging to the applicant union. However, it is brought about by Belgium"s general policy of restricting the number of organisations to be consulted. This policy is not on its own incompatible with trade union freedom; the steps taken to implement it escape supervision by the Court provided that they do not contravene Articles 11 and 14 (art. 14 + 11) read in conjunction.
42. Having thus found that there is no violation of paragraph 1 of Article 11 (art. 11-1), the Court is not called upon to have regard to paragraph 2 (art. 11-2), on which in any case both the Commission and the Government stated they did not rely.
II. As to the alleged violation of Articles 11
and 14 (art. 11, art. 14)
43. Article 14 (art. 14) is worded as follows: "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status."
44. Although the Court has found no violation of Article 11 para. 1 (art. 11-1), it has to be ascertained whether the differences in treatment complained of by the applicant union contravene Articles 11 and 14 (art. 14 + 11) taken together. Although Article 14 (art. 14) has no independent existence, it is complementary to the other normative provisions of the Convention and Protocols: it safeguards individuals, or groups of individuals, placed in comparable situations, from all discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in those provisions. A measure which in itself is in conformity with the requirements of the Article enshrining the right or freedom in question may therefore infringe this Article when read in conjunction with Article 14 (art. 14) for the reason that it is of a discriminatory nature. It is as though Article 14 (art. 14) formed an integral part of each of the Articles laying down rights and freedoms whatever their nature (case relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium, judgment of 23 July 1968, Series A no. 6, pp. 33 - 34, para. 9).
These considerations apply in particular where a right embodied in the Convention and the corresponding obligation on the part of the State are not defined precisely, and consequently the State has a wide choice of the means for making the exercise of the right possible and effective. As the Court has noted above at paragraph 39, Article 11 para. 1 (art. 11-1) enunciates a right of this kind.
45. The Court has already found that the applicant is at a disadvantage compared with certain other trade unions. The subject-matter of the disadvantage, i.e., consultation, is no doubt one which in principle is left by Article 11 para. 1 (art. 11-1) to the discretion of the Contracting States, but it constitutes one of the modalities of the exercise of a right guaranteed by this provision as it has been interpreted by the Court at paragraph 39 above, i.e., the right of the members of a trade union that their union be heard in the protection of their interests. Belgium has in fact instituted a system of consultation in its relations with provincial and municipal staff as well as with its own officials; the State has selected consultation as one of the means of making possible the conduct and development by trade unions of collective action in the protection of their members" occupational interests. Accordingly, Article 14 (art. 14) is pertinent in the present context.
46. It is not every distinction, however, that amounts to discrimination. In the judgment cited above, the Court stated that "in spite of the very general wording of the French version ("sans distinction aucune"), Article 14 (art. 14) does not forbid every difference in treatment in the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised". Taking care to identify "the criteria which enable a determination to be made as to whether or not a given difference in treatment ... contravenes Article 14 (art. 14)", the Court held that "the principle of equality of treatment is violated if the distinction has no objective and reasonable justification", and that "the existence of such a justification must be assessed in relation to the aim and effects of the measure under consideration, regard being had to the principles which normally prevail in democratic societies". The Court went on to point out that "a difference of treatment in the exercise of a right laid down in the Convention must not only pursue a legitimate aim: Article 14 (art. 14) is likewise violated when it is clearly established that there is no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised" (ibid. p. 34, para. 10).
47. It is the duty of the Court to see whether the differences of treatment at issue have this kind of discriminatory character. In so doing, the Court "cannot assume the {role} of the competent national authorities" which "remain free to choose the measures which they consider appropriate in those matters which are governed by the Convention"; "review by the Court concerns only the conformity of these measures with the requirements of Convention" (ibid. p. 35, para. 10).
48. The applicant union complains of not being a body which must be consulted by the Ministry of the Interior, like the three trade unions open to all provincial and municipal staff, on proposals of interest to the municipal police, no matter whether such proposals concern all categories of municipal officials or particularly the police.
As the Court has pointed out above, the Royal Decree of 2 August 1966 has in this respect caused inequality of treatment to the prejudice of the "category-based" organisations such as the applicant union. The Government has urged that it wished to avoid "trade union anarchy" and considered it necessary "to ensure a coherent and balanced staff policy, taking due account of the occupational interests of all provincial and communal staff". This is a legitimate aim in itself and the Court has no reason to think that the Government had other and ill-intentioned designs underlying Article 2 para. 2 of the above Royal Decree. In particular, there is nothing to show that the authorities intended to confer on the three large trade union organisations, on account of their all being politically committed, an exlusive privilege in the matter; besides, if there existed or were to exist a trade union organisation without political leanings open to all provincial and municipal staff and protecting their occupational interests, the provision at issue would compel the Minister of the Interior to consult that organisation too.
The applicant union has stated, it is true, that it is hard to see "how the Government can claim that it is in the general interest to avoid fragmentation of trade union organisations in matters connected with the municipal police, when the Government itself has kept separate the trade union activities of the criminal police and has recognised a category-based apolitical union as the only organisation representing members of the gendarmerie". In the Court"s opinion, however, Articles 11 and 14 (art. 11, art. 14) of the Convention do not oblige Belgium to set up for provincial and municipal staff, and for the municipal police in particular, a consultation system analogous to the one in operation for State officials, including members of the criminal police attached to the prosecuting authorities and of the gendarmerie.
49. It remains to be seen whether the disadvantages to which members of the applicant union are put compared with members of the trade unions consulted under the Act of 27 July 1961 is justified not only in principle (paragraph 48 above) but also in scope.
The answer seems clear insofar as consultation covers questions of a general nature which are of interest to all provincial and municipal staff: in this regard, the measure contained in Article 2 para. 2 of the Royal Decree of 2 August 1966 is a proper means of attaining the legitimate aim sought to be realised.
Finally, the Court has examined the question whether discrimination, contrary to Articles 11 and 14 (art. 14 + 11) taken together, resul